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Abstract
Researchers in comparative research are increasingly relying on individual level data to
test theories involving unobservable constructs like attitudes and preferences. Estimation is
carried out using large-scale cross-national survey data providing responses from individuals
living in widely varying contexts. This strategy rests on the assumption of equivalence, i.e.
that no systematic distortion in response behavior of individuals from different countries
exists. However this assumption is frequently violated with rather grave consequences for
comparability and interpretation. I present a Multilevel Mixture Ordinal Item Response
Model with Item-bias Effects that is able to establish equivalence. It corrects for systematic
measurement error induced by unobserved country heterogeneity and it allows for the
simultaneous estimation of structural parameters of interest.
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1 Introduction
The availability of large-scale cross-national surveys (like Eurobarometer, European Social
Survey, International Social Survey Programme, and World Values Survey) has led to a
steady increase in comparative social research. Comparative researchers are now able to
simultaneously examine individual attitudes and preferences in a large number of countries.
This allows us to test general theories in as many contexts as possible (King et al. 1994)
and to examine interesting macro-micro relationships. However, this enterprise will only be
successful if the survey questions used are comparable, or equivalent, between countries.
Therefore, researchers examining topics as diverse as attitudes towards immigration
(e.g O’Rourke and Sinnott 2006), ethnic and social tolerance (e.g Weldon 2006), social
and political trust (e.g. Delhey and Newton 2005; Hooghe et al. 2009), public opinion
on European integration (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004), as well as redistribution (among
many, Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2005; Scheve and Stasavage 2006) and
trade preferences (Rodrik and Mayda 2005) face a similar problem: have they obtained
meaningful results or are they comparing apples and oranges?1 Most researchers are
aware of the problem and acknowledge the existence of country heterogeneity in attitudes
and preferences and usually opt for multilevel models (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) to
capture country differences. But what is usually ignored is the possibility of systematic
country-item-bias – differences in response behavior that are not due to true attitudinal
differences but the result of country specific (non-random) measurement error.
In this paper I outline a strategy that solves this problem using a model-based approach.
I propose a multilevel mixture item response theory model with item-bias effects, which
offers a number of distinct advantages. First, it uses a straightforward and explicit model
of the individual response process. Individuals’ responses to observed survey items are
a function of unobserved preferences: the stronger someone’s preference for, say, social
spending, the more positively she will respond to survey items probing support for spending
on various programs. Second, the prevalence of Likert-type survey questions is taken into
account by employing an IRT model for ordered polytomous variables instead of assuming
continuous items. Third, comparative survey data is by definition hierarchical: individuals
are nested within higher level units, usually countries. With a multilevel IRT model, this
nesting is modeled explicitly by including country level random effects. Fourth, country
specific item-bias is captured by including item-bias effects in the response function of an
item, so that the resulting latent variable is ‘purged’ of country idiosyncrasies that distort
individual responses. Fifth, the model allows for covariate effects on the latent trait, so
that measurement issues and substantive theories can be tested in the same model, and
researchers do not have to rely on two-step estimation strategies.
In the next section, I discuss the problem of equivalence in detail. In Section 3, I
first present an approach that is often posited as an appropriate solution and discuss its
1Note that Hooghe et al. (2009) are one of the few researchers who mention the possibility of item bias,
c.f. Reeskens and Hooghe 2008.
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shortcomings when applied to comparative political research. I then present the multilevel
mixture item response model with item-bias effects as an alternative, which can be used
to simultaneously correct for country-level biases in response behavior and estimate the
structural model with explanatory variables of interest. Its application is demonstrated
with a theory relating skill specificity to preferences for social spending, which I outline in
section 4. I discuss estimation results in section 5 and compare them to results obtained
with commonly used model specifications that use factor scores as the dependent variable.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The problem of equivalence in comparative research
2.1 Are individual measures comparable?
Constructs like social and political trust, redistribution preferences, ethnic tolerance and
attitudes towards immigration lie within the individual and are not directly observable
(Jackman 2008: 119). Consequently, one tries to tap those quantities using multiple
indicators. For example, preferences for social spending can be captured using questions on
an individual’s preferred level of spending in different areas such as health, unemployment
and pensions.2 Usually, researchers use latent variable models like factor analysis (Kim
and Mueller 1978), in order to combine items into a common scale and to remove random
measurement error. The model of interest is then estimated using factor scores as dependent
variable and usually includes country fixed or random effects.
This strategy ignores a serious threat to valid inferences that stems from the fact that
countries differ systematically in the way its inhabitants answer survey questions. Those
method effects will produce spurious measures of preferences or attitudes when not ac-
counted for. Recent work in survey methodology and cross-cultural psychology has shown
that respondents from different countries (and cultures) show systematic and stable ten-
dencies to respond differently to survey questions – irrespective of question content (Baum-
gartner and Steenkamp 2001; van Herk et al. 2004; Johnson et al. 2005; Schwarz 2003).
In some countries individuals are predominantly acquiescent, i.e. they have a tendency to
select only one side of the scale (usually the one indicating agreement). Some countries
produce extreme responders, who consistently choose extreme ends of scales, while in other
countries individuals predominantly choose the middle part of a response scale – avoiding
strong statements (Yang et al. 2010).
In consequence this means that two individuals sharing the same level of preference may
answer survey questions differently, simply because one of them is from a country where
an extreme response style is common. Scores from individuals from different countries are
then no longer directly comparable, since they are systematically biased (Millsap and Kwok
2As has been done by Iversen and Soskice (2001). More on that in section 4.2.
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Figure 1: Ideal typical illustration of item bias. Panel A shows a situation where different
responses of two individuals from different countries are the result of them having different
preferences. Item-bias, as shown in panel B, exists when two individuals with the same
preference give different responses simply because of country specific factors that influence
their measurements.
2004). In other words, the dependent variable lacks equivalence (Fontaine 2005; Johnson
1998; van Deth 1998).
The problem is depicted in ideal-typical form in Figure 1. Panel A shows a comfortable
state of the survey research world where no item-bias exists. That an individual j living
in country k responds differently from an individual living in country k′ is completely due
to the fact that they have different preferences (η jk 6= η′jk′). Panel B shows the opposite
situation. Now our two individuals share the same level of preference or attitude strength
(η jk = η jk′), but their responses differ due to the systematic country differences discussed
above. Clearly, the differences between those individuals are not real but the result of
country method effects, so that latent preferences cannot be compared between countries
(cf. Horn and McArdle 1992; Meredith 1993). Of course, in practical comparative survey
research applications we will be confronted with a mix between both scenarios.
This raises suspicions about simply combining individual responses from different
countries and they should be taken seriously. After all, the methodological foundation of
comparative research is comparability: an “a prior belief in the similarity of the bases of
behavior across units or time periods or contexts”(Bartels 1996: 906). When carrying out
comparative analyses we should therefore try to disentangle (true) attitude differences
from (spurious) country-item-bias effects.
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2.2 Why measurement models?
There is no quick fix to the problem raised in the previous section.3 Using standard factor
analysis (exploratory or confirmatory) to measure a latent construct does not take into
account cross-national differences in response behavior. Using scores obtained from such a
factor analysis in a regression model produces biased estimates yielding distorted quantities
of interest. Another simple way out may be to estimate separate models for each item
and country. This way similarity is not assumed and differences between countries can
easily manifest themselves in varying regression weights. But here is where the problems
start: we will almost never find completely concurrent parameter estimates so that one
ends up with enormous tables of coefficients. How large, then, do differences have to be
before there is reason for concern? What substantive conclusions should we draw from
differing parameter estimates, especially since the difference between a “significant” and
a “non-significant” parameter is not necessarily statistically significant (Gelman and Stern
2006)? The way forward lies in using an appropriate measurement model that deals with
the problem of equivalence.
3 Establishing equivalence
3.1 The predominant approach and its disadvantages
The predominantly used latent variable approach to tackle problems of measurement
equivalence is multi-group confirmatory factor modeling (MG-CFA). A confirmatory factor
model is fitted in each country (Jöreskog 1971) and a hierarchy of models is tested by
imposing equality constraints on intercepts and loadings (see, among many, Baumgartner
and Steenkamp 1998; Salzberger et al. 1999). This way, one can distinguish between
different levels of “invariance”: (1) configural invariance – the model fits the data and
factor loadings are significant and substantially different from zero, so that the basic
structure is the same in each country; (2) metric invariance – loadings are equal across
groups, so that structural relationships may be compared; and most importantly (3) scalar
invariance – intercepts are equal across groups, so that mean differences can be substantially
compared. A recent introduction of this approach into political science is given by Davidov
(2009) in this journal. While it is theoretically elegant and allows for detailed examination
of the measurement properties of survey items, it has some disadvantages when using it as
a routine tool in applied comparative political research.
Firstly, researchers are usually interested in testing their structural relationships in as
large a number of countries as possible. If one finds clearly “non-invariant” countries in
MG-CFA, the straightforward response would be to discard those from the analysis. But one
3I assume that the researcher is conducting a secondary analysis of existing large-scale data (Hyman 1972).
If the researcher has control over survey design and data collection a promising strategy is to use anchoring
vignettes (King et al. 2004; King and Wand 2007).
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then faces an uncomfortable trade-off between measurement quality and coverage of the
model. As the number of remaining countries gets smaller the term “comparative” becomes
more and more meaningless.
Secondly, in the MG-CFA approach, one is able to proceed even when some items are
found to be “non-invariant”, using the argument of “partial measurement invariance” – as
long as two invariant items are available (Byrne et al. 1989; Baumgartner and Steenkamp
2004). In many situations this is not the case, since most applications will be carried
out using secondary data with only a very limited number of items at one’s disposal.
Furthermore, discarding items identified as “non-invariant” is often not an option.
Thirdly, survey measures are mostly ordinal, a fact that is ignored by most MG-CFA
applications (Lubke and Muthén 2004) and which may lead to biased estimates, making
equivalence tests less convincing (would we trust a standard linear regression for categorical
survey items?). Furthermore, treating the data as multivariate normal leads to a distorted
representation of the individual response process.
The alternative approach, presented below, circumvents such problems and shifts focus
from testing invariance to creating a model for the measurement error, so that deficiencies
can be corrected while estimating structural parameters of interest.
3.2 An alternative: Multilevel mixture item response theory model
with item-bias effects
We start by modeling an individual’s response to several items as a function of his or her
level of (unobserved) preference. Since survey items used by comparative researchers
are usually categorical, I use an item response theory approach (for an introduction, see
Hambleton et al. 1991).4 Modern item response theory (IRT) uses the generalized linear
model framework (McCullagh and Nelder 1989) to link categorical responses to a latent
variable (e.g. Mellenbergh 1994; Moustaki and Knott 2000). Therefore, we can embed it in
the more general generalized linear latent and mixed model framework that unifies factor
and random effects models (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004)
and which allows me to formulate an appropriate multilevel IRT model for comparative
research.5
For each categorical item we estimate thresholds that map the categories onto a con-
4IRT models are increasingly used in political science to measure ideal points of legislators (Clinton et al.
2004), judges (Martin and Quinn 2002) or voters (Jesse 2009). Those models are usually for dichotomous
items and geared towards applications with many items and a rather small number of individuals. The
approach presented in this paper is concerned with what researchers using comparative surveys will usually
encounter: a small number of ordinal survey items (e.g. the commonly found agree–disagree scales) for a
large number of individuals. Note that it is also applicable when only dichotomous survey items are available.
5The following discussion uses the factor-formulation of item response models (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh
2004: 71). On the equivalence between classical IRT and the factor analytic formulation see Takane and de
Leeuw (1987).
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tinuous construct. Just like in an ordinal logit or probit model, this conceptualizes an
individual’s response process as driven by an unobservable latent continuum, with observed
categories as its discrete realization. For each item i (i = 1, . . . , I), an item response model
is defined by modeling the cumulative probability νi jkc that person j ( j = 1, . . . , nk) living
in country k (k = 1, . . . , K) chooses category c (c = 1, . . . , C) or lower (cf. Samejima 1969;
Johnson and Albert 1999; Moustaki 2000):
log

Pr(yi jk ≤ c)
Pr(yi jk > c)

= νi jkc (1)
This probability is modeled as a function of C − 1 item-specific threshold parameters
τic, which are constrained to be strictly monotonously increasing, and a common factor, or
latent trait, η jk representing each individual’s preference,
νi jkc = τic −λ(1)i η(2)jk . (2)
The ‘factor loadings’ λi represent the strength of relationship between each item i and
the latent preference variable η jk, while τic can be interpreted as ‘intensity’: the higher
the threshold, the stronger your preference must be to pass it.6 To make the notation
more readable, I use superscripts to denote the ‘level’ of each parameter (Rabe-Hesketh
et al. 2004). Here we have a ‘two-level’ model, where items (level one) are nested within
individuals (level two). Consequently, preferences are properties of individuals, whereas
the loadings connecting items to preferences are on the item level.7 The shape of the
resulting response function is illustrated in the left part of Figure 2. As given in equations 1
and 2 the model does not yield a unique solution. Identification is achieved by defining
η
(2)
jk ∼ N(0, 1). This sets the scale of the latent variable to have mean zero and a standard
deviation of one.8
From the cumulative probabilities we can derive the probability that a randomly chosen
6This model is known in psychometrics as graded response model (Samejima 1969). It assumes that the
items used are non-trivially related to the latent construct in each country. For example, if one measures
latent social spending preferences via, among others, an item on unemployment spending and some countries
would not spend resources on unemployment programs at all, this assumption would be obviously violated.
7Similar hierarchical conceptualizations have been used by De Boeck and Wilson (2004) and Rijmen et al.
(2003). Its advantage lies primarily in its transparent way of dealing with missing responses: Since items
are nested in persons, missing item responses simply result in different cluster sizes for some individuals.
Therefore, they can be handled during model estimation (under the assumption that they are missing at
random, as defined in Little and Rubin 2002) and no imputation strategy is needed.
8The model employs the assumption of local independence shared by virtually all latent variable models:
that there is no relationship between items once we condition on the latent trait (Lazarsfeld 1959; Jackman
2008).
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Figure 2: Illustrative response functions and associated category response functions for an
item with parameters λ= 1.5, τ1 = −4, τ2 = −1, τ3 = 2, and τ4 = 5.
individual responds in a certain category (e.g. Greene and Hensher 2010):
Pr(y = 1) =νi jk1 (3)
Pr(y = c) =νi jkc − νi jk,c−1 , c = 2, . . . , C − 1 (4)
Pr(y = C) =1− νi jk,C−1 (5)
leading to a set of category response functions depicted in the right part of Figure 2. It
clearly shows how responding in a higher category of an item (i.e. choosing “agree” instead
of “neither nor”) is a result of an individual possessing a stronger preference or attitude
strength.
When using pooled comparative data, unobserved country heterogeneity should be
taken into account. This can be achieved by using a multilevel IRT model (e.g Fox and Glas
2001; Vermunt 2008; Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2004; Lee and Shi 2001) which allows for random
variation in individuals’ attitudes or preferences between countries. Therefore, I include
a country-level latent variable, or random effect, η(3)k with estimated effect coefficients
γ(2) that affect the means of the latent trait. This captures systematic mean differences in
preferences induced by, for example, different institutions and policies that are not explicitly
included as covariates. Differences due to observed covariates x i j are modeled by P effect
coefficients β (2)p ,
η
(2)
jk =
P∑
p=1
β (2)p x jk + γ
(2)η
(3)
k . (6)
A graphical representation of this model is shown in panel A of Figure 3.9 It is a three-level
hierarchical model with items nested within persons nested within countries. The key point
9It depicts the slightly more complex model specification. The role of the m subscript becomes clear in
Section 3.4.
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of Multilevel mixture ordinal item response models.
Panel A shows a model that assumes complete measurement equivalence, panel B shows a
model with country-item-bias effects δ(1)im
of this graph is to emphasize the rather straightforward nature of a standard multilevel
IRT setup. Individual preferences are measured using a latent variable that generates
observed item responses. Response heterogeneity does exist, but it is completely due to true
differences in preferences between individuals, captured by covariates x jk and unobserved
country factors η(3)k (cf. panel A of Figure 1).
What such a model does not include, is the possibility of systematic country-item-bias
in response probabilities as was illustrated in panel B of Figure 1. This issue lies at the core
of my proposal to establishing equivalence and it is what we turn to next.
3.3 Modeling item bias
As discussed above and illustrated in panel B of Figure 1, item-bias is caused by country-
induced differences in scale-usage which leads to systematically different item responses by
persons sharing the same position on the latent trait. In other words, the core assumption
of the IRT measurement model, namely that the association between observed items is
explained by the latent preference variable, is violated, since unobserved country-specific
factors induce correlations between items not captured by the latent variable (Moustaki
et al. 2004). These systematic country differences in response probabilities can be captured
by allowing the country-level latent variable η(3)k to directly influence individuals’ item
response probabilities. In the generalized linear latent mixed model framework this is
achieved by including direct effects δ(1)i of the country level latent variable η
(3)
k on item
response probabilities (Muthén 1989; Moustaki 2003; Moustaki et al. 2004; Rabe-Hesketh
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et al. 2004: 177):
νi jkc = τic −λ(1)i η(2)jk −δ(1)i η(3)k . (7)
As the country random effects influence the latent preference variable as well as item
response probabilities, I choose one item as reference category to identify the direct effects
(cf. Moustaki 2003):
δ
(1)
1 = 0. (8)
These direct effects, δ(1)i , shown in panel B of Figure 3, operate on the item level and
model systematic country bias in response probabilities: they shift the thresholds of the
ordinal response categories, yielding different response probabilities for individuals from
different countries after conditioning on their level of preference. This formulation allows for
a straightforward specification test: Item-bias estimates δ(1)i that are significantly different
from zero show that systematic country-item-bias in response probabilities exists. In such a
case, simply pooling countries by using item sum-scores, exploratory or confirmatory factor
analysis ignores those systematic threshold shifts; therefore producing biased measurements
of preferences and structural estimates of covariates.
3.4 Using finite mixtures to estimate the country random effects dis-
tribution
Thus far I have left the distribution of the random effects unspecified. When modeling
random effects in a conventional fashion, one specifies them as being normally distributed,
centered at zero with a freely estimated variance parameter. Alternatively, random effects
can be specified without making parametric assumptions (Aitkin 1999), by treating them
as an unspecified discrete mixing distribution of a number of discrete ‘components’ or
‘mixtures’ (McLachlan and Peel 2000; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004: 114). In other
words, we assume that random effects are not continuous but nominal latent variables
(Vermunt 2004: 227). Specifying the direct effects given in equation 7 via a nominal latent
variable with M mixtures yields:
νi jkc = τic −λ(1)i η(2)jk −
M∑
m=1
δ
(1)
imη
(3)
km. (9)
where δ(1)im is now a vector of unknown random effects for countries belonging to mixture
m (m = 1, . . . , M). For identification one either sets one component m to zero or imposes a
sum-to-zero constraint (e.g Fennessey 1986). Here, I follow the latter strategy and specify
M∑
m=1
δ
(1)
im = 0. (10)
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Using a nominal latent variable has two advantages. First, this approach yields a limited
number of mixtures of countries sharing the same parameter values.10 With the sum-
to-zero coding used above, this yields estimates of how much groups of countries show
biased response probabilities relative to the overall mean.11 Second, as the number of
countries in comparative politics applications is often small, researchers might be unwilling
to assume normality of random effects. A nominal latent variable can be interpreted
as a nonparametric approximation to the true random effects distribution, which does
not rely on assumptions of normality.12 This approximation is achieved by selecting the
number of mixture components such that the likelihood is maximized, yielding the so-called
nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator (Laird 1978; Aitkin 1999; Skrondal and
Rabe-Hesketh 2004).
For the random effects on the latent preference variable, given in equation 6, I also
specify a discrete mixing distribution as defined above, i.e.
∑M
m=1 γ
(2)
m η
(3)
km, and apply sum-
to-zero coding for identification:
M∑
m=1
γ(2)m = 0. (11)
3.5 Complete model and estimation
Putting all the pieces together, the complete multilevel mixture item response theory model
describes an individual’s response to a certain category of a survey item as function of his or
her latent preference and unobserved country specific response bias. Latent preferences are
shaped by unobserved country differences (‘random intercepts’) and observed individual
10Another implementation of this idea is given by De Jong and Steenkamp (2010), who develop a multi-
dimensional IRT model in a Bayesian framework (see also Millsap and Yun-Tein (2004) and Song and Lee
(2004) for similar specifications). Their model adds a level of complexity by combining continuous and
discrete random effects distributions. More specifically, they allow for non-invariant items by drawing them
from (censored) normal distributions within several mixtures. In contrast, my model is closer to the classic
MIMIC approach for allowing non-invariance (Muthén 1989) and will work well, even when the number
of items is small and researchers are unwilling (or unable) to make further distributional assumptions. De
Jong and Steenkamp’s (2010) model setup would be preferred if researchers are interested in examining
correlations between latent variables, for example the across-country relationship between anti-immigrant
attitudes and social policy preferences.
11The assignment of countries to mixture components is probabilistic, i.e. each country has a posterior
probability for belonging to each mixture. In the application that follows, I use the posterior mode to assign
each country (i.e. assign it to the mixture where it has the highest probability of belonging to), which leads
to a considerably easier interpretation of results.
12A famous application of this strategy is Heckman and Singer (1984).
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level characteristics:
νi jkc = τic −λ(1)i η(2)jk −
M∑
m=1
δ
(1)
imη
(3)
km (12)
η
(2)
jk =
P∑
p=1
β (2)p x jk +
M∑
m=1
γ(2)m η
(3)
km. (13)
Thus, it allows for joint estimation of the latent variable measurement model, which corrects
for country-item-bias, and the structural model linking latent preferences to observed
covariates. Estimating measurement and structural part jointly in one model is preferable to
the widespread ‘two-step’ practice of estimating factor scores and subsequently using them
in regression models. As discussed by Skrondal and Laake (2001), this practice ignores the
imprecision of the estimated scores, which leads to deflated standard errors (see also Croon
and Bolck 1997).
This model (with identifying restrictions given by equations 8, 10, and 11) can be
estimated by treating the latent variables as missing data which are estimated using the EM
algorithm (McLachlan and Krishnan 2008). Integration of the continuous latent preference
variable is done via standard Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004)
using 15 quadrature points.13 Details of the implementation of the algorithm are given in
Vermunt (2004).14 With models of this complexity, there is a fair chance that the algorithm
converges to a local instead of the global maximum. To avoid this, I ran each model (at
least) 10 times using a random number generator to obtain initial parameter values and
then used the initial values that gave the highest log-likelihood as starting point for the
final model run.
4 Application: skill specificity and preferences for
social spending
4.1 Redistribution and political preferences
Already during the formation of democratic forms of government, the topic of redistribution
captured the imagination of thinkers and scholars. John Stuart Mill famously stated that
“those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people’s money, have every motive
to be lavish and none to economise.” Instead they “put their hands into the people’s pockets
for any purpose which they think fit to call a public one” (Mill 2007: 281). This intuition
13Since results can be sensitive to the number of integration points (Lesaffre and Spiessens 2001), one
should carry out robustness checks using more points. In the application that follows I used 30 integration
points with no difference in results.
14The model can be estimated by the syntax version of LatentGold (Vermunt and Magidson 2008). Detailed
instructions for data coding and model syntax are available on the author’s website.
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Figure 4: Income, general (g) and specific (s) skills and preferences for redistribution (see
Iversen and Soskice 2001: 878). Shown is income of the median voter (M) and mean
income in the population (w).
can be captured in a simple median voter model. If we assume a (typical) right-skewed
income distribution and flat-rate benefits paid under a proportional tax regime, those with
incomes below the mean will prefer maximal taxation (so that utility can be represented by
a simple step function). The model can be extended towards more realism, as by Meltzer
and Richard (1981), who add efficiency loss of taxation. Tax disincentives may deter
low-income workers close to the mean from supporting the maximum rate of taxation. If the
median voter is among this group, he will vote for taxation up to the point where benefits
are offset by the efficiency cost of taxation, i.e. she will choose a positive tax rate of less
than one.15
Up until now, redistribution has been strictly considered as one-shot transfers from rich
to poor. However, if one adds a prospective element things change quite a bit. It can be
argued that specific forms of social spending – like unemployment benefits – function as
insurance, since they protect individuals against risks they are likely to face over their life
course (Sinn 1995). Given that workers are risk averse, rising income is connected with
increasing demand for redistribution (Varian 1980).
The previous model conceptualizes workers as a monolithic group, which may be too
much of an abstraction. To relax this assumption, Iversen and Soskice (2001) propose to
consider investments in human capital as a critical factor. They differentiate between two
15The empirical track record of the model is quite limited, e.g. Rodrigiuez (1999); Gouveia and Masia
(1998); Moene and Wallerstein (2003).
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types of skills: (a) specific skills are only useful to a single firm or sector, while (b) general
skills are transferable across firms and sectors (cf. Becker 1993). Individuals with high
levels of specific skills are more vulnerable to adverse labor market conditions: in case of
unemployment they might have to accept jobs which do not utilize their full set of skills –
leading to substantial loss of income (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001).16
As illustrated in Figure 4 introducing skills transforms the relationship between income
and redistribution considerably. Holding income constant, the higher the ratio of specific
to general skills, the more an individual will prefer redistributive spending. Clearly, then,
the level of support for social protection depends on the composition of the median voter’s
skills.17 This replaces an overly simplistic “capitalists vs. workers” class model with an
approach that focuses on distribution conflicts between groups with different positions in
the economy (cf. Iversen 2005, 2006).
4.2 Data and variables
Following the seminal article by Iversen and Soskice (2001), I use data from the International
Social Survey Programme’s 1996 role of government module.18 The effects of our two
central exogenous variables (income and skills) will be tested using measures capturing the
preferred level of social spending in three areas that can be straightforwardly related to the
insurance motive: health, unemployment, and pensions. The exact question wording is:
Listed below are various areas of government spending. Please show if you like to see more
or less government spending in each area. Remember that if you say “much more” it might
require a tax increase to pay for it. . . . [Health] [Old age pensions], [Unemployment benefits].
Response options were: [Spend much less], [Spend less], [Spend the same as now], [Spend
more], [Spend much more] whose distribution are shown in Table 1.19
Income is standardized to have a within-country mean of zero with a standard deviation
of one. Skill specificity is a composite measure, combining two operationalizations of the skill
specificity concept (based on education and skills as defined by ISCO levels).20 Furthermore,
the current labor market status of an individual is included, with the expectation that
especially part-time employment (being ‘at risk’) and unemployment (‘realized risk’) foster
16On the other hand, workers equipped only with general skills will always receive income at their general
skill level.
17In the “bigger picture” this amounts to the argument, that the welfare state may (and does) function as a
guarantee that it is safe to invest in specific skills.
18I conducted analysis using a 50 % random subsample. This leaves a sample size of 5987 from 12
countries: Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Germany East, Germany West, Ireland, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and United States. Data and replication materials can be found at http:
//hdl.handle.net/1902.1/16225.
19I reversed the original scale to enable a more direct interpretation.
20For details see Iversen and Soskice (2001: 881-2) and http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/
~iversen/SkillSpecificity.htm#Explanation. I am indebted to Philipp Rehm for providing me his
data on skill specificity.
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Table 1: Stated support for spending on unemployment, health and pensions in 12 countries.
Means and percentage of responses in highest possible category.
Unemployment Health Pensions
mean highest mean highest mean highest
Australia 2.49 1.5% 4.05 29.4% 3.53 9.5%
Canada 2.75 2.9% 3.57 13.1% 3.19 5.9%
France 2.81 5.3% 3.51 16.6% 3.28 9.6%
Germany (East) 3.61 16.8% 3.93 27.3% 3.64 14.5%
Germany (West) 3.08 5.8% 3.60 18.2% 3.43 9.4%
Great Britain 3.16 6.1% 4.33 42.3% 4.04 26.5%
Ireland 3.47 14.8% 4.18 35.6% 4.04 28.9%
New Zealand 2.38 1.3% 4.15 31.5% 3.45 8.6%
Norway 2.97 4.0% 4.12 27.3% 3.67 13.3%
Sweden 3.33 10.3% 3.99 25.4% 3.65 13.7%
Switzerland 3.00 4.4% 3.21 6.6% 3.33 6.4%
United States 3.05 6.7% 3.75 16.9% 3.49 12.4%
strong support for redistribution. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the remaining
variables included as controls in the analysis. Since they are pretty standard I will not
discuss them further (the reasons for including them are given in Iversen and Soskice 2001:
881-3)
In the next section I present results obtained by applying the approach outlined previ-
ously and compare it to models that are predominantly used in practice.
5 Results
Table 3 shows statistics for a series of models with an increasing number of mixture compo-
nents fitted to the ISSP data. The likelihood is maximized using six mixture components
(Model 4) – a clear testimony to the existence of heterogeneity in our sample.21 Both infor-
mation theory based measures, which penalize for increasing model complexity (Burnham
and Anderson 2003), also select that model. For comparison, I fitted the model without the
finite mixture part, assuming a normal distribution for the random country effects. Clearly,
the finite mixture variants provide a better approximation to the distribution of the country
level latent variable.22
21See the discussion of the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator in subsection 3.4.
22However, results do not critically depend on those use of a nominal latent variable. Appendix tables
A.2 and A.3 shows results using continuous random effects (Model 6). The only substantive difference that
emerges in the structural is the non-significant effect of being part-time employed, whose effects was already
rather uncertain in the NPML model. The measurement model properties are comparable to the NPML
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Variable Mean SD
Income −0.02 0.91
Skill specificity 1.50 0.97
Part-time employed 0.16 0.36
Unemployed 0.03 0.18
Not in Labor Force 0.20 0.40
Self-employed 0.12 0.32
Age 43.44 14.02
Female 0.48 0.50
Informed 3.33 1.00
Left-Right party support 2.92 0.78
Table 3: Log-likelihod, Bayesian Information Criterion and Akaike Information Criterion for
fitted models.
Mixture
Model Comp. Log-lik N par. BIC AICc
η
(3)
k discrete
M1 3 −19710 33 39707 39740
M2 4 −19594 37 39510 39547
M3 5 −19586 41 39528 39569
M4 6 −19482 45 39356 39401
M5 7 −19483 49 39391 39440
η
(3)
k continuous
M6 — −19766 29 39776 39804
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Figure 5: Point estimates and 95% confidence bounds for loadings [λ(1)i ] and thresholds
[τic]. Multilevel mixture ordinal item response model with item-bias effects (M4).
5.1 IRT measurement model
Let us first look at the model’s measurement part. Figure 5 shows point estimates and 95%
confidence intervals for the standard IRT part of the model. Numerical results are displayed
in Table A.1 in the online appendix. Inspecting factor loadings and intercepts shows that
all three items posses good measurement properties. They are strongly and significantly
related to the latent trait and their category thresholds are spread out nicely, providing
precise measurement over a wide range of the latent trait. Furthermore, estimates of item
parameters are quite precise – which is not surprising giving the large number of cases
available for the analysis.
5.2 Country-item-bias effects
To assess the impact of unobserved systematic country effects on the probability of item
responses,we turn to Figure 6 (see also Table A.1). It shows estimates of country-item-
bias effects δ(1)im . Remember that significant estimates indicate the existence of systematic
country bias in item response behavior.23 Some clear and interesting patterns emerge.
Firstly, the role of country-item-bias cannot be ignored. Except for Canada and France,
all countries differ significantly in their probability of item-category responses (i.e. have
estimates and random effect coefficients also indicate that substantial country bias exists.
23I assigned countries to mixture components based on modal posterior mixture membership probabilities
which facilitates a more articulate interpretation.
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Figure 6: Point estimates and 95% confidence bounds for item-bias effects [ δ(1)im ]. Multilevel
mixture ordinal item response model (M4).
different threshold levels). With the exception of East-Germany and Sweden, the direction
of this response bias is the same for both items.
The strongest deviation from the overall mean is found among individuals from Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and Switzerland. In order to gauge the extent of these country-item
biases, imagine two individuals with exactly the same social spending preference. If one
individual lives in the Eastern part of Germany or Sweden, his or her predicted probability
for responding in the highest category of the unemployment spending item is calculated
as being 7.7 percent. Someone with exactly the same preference living in Australia or
New Zealand would respond in the highest category with only a probability of 0.3 percent.
This difference in response probabilities is the results of country method effects. Simply
combining such responses from different countries without correcting for country-item-bias
produces biased scores on the latent preference variable: individuals’ preferences will
be systematically overestimated in some countries (those with significantly positive item
bias effects), while being systematically underestimates in others (those with significantly
negative item bias effects).
5.3 Structural model
Table 4 shows results of the structural part of the model, as well as country random effects
influencing the latent means, which capture true attitude differences between countries.
Here, too, we see substantial preference differences between countries.24 Especially Switzer-
land is characterized by an overall strong preference for redistribution of its inhabitants.
24As discussed in Section 2 we usually find a mix of true country differences and country method effects.
The key is to use a model that includes both – like the one presented here.
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Table 4: Structural part of Model 4. Point estimates, standard errors and 95% confidence
bounds for covariate effects [β (2)p ] and discrete random effect [γ
(2)
m ]. Countries represented
by each mixture component are given in brackets.
95% CI
Coef. s.e. low high
Covariate effects
β
(2)
1 [Income] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.056 0.019 −0.093 −0.018
β
(2)
2 [Skills] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.152 0.018 0.118 0.187
β
(2)
3 [Part-time] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.133 0.050 0.034 0.232
β
(2)
4 [Unemployed] . . . . . . . . . . . 0.592 0.094 0.408 0.776
β
(2)
5 [Not in LF] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.233 0.051 0.133 0.333
β
(2)
6 [Self-employed] . . . . . . . . . −0.209 0.052 −0.311 −0.106
β
(2)
7 [Age] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.001 0.001 −0.001 0.004
β
(2)
8 [Female] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.209 0.037 0.137 0.282
β
(2)
9 [Informed] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.048 0.017 −0.081 −0.014
β
(2)
10 [L-R party support] . . . . . . −0.261 0.022 −0.304 −0.217
Discrete Random effect
γ
(2)
1 [AU, NZ] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.838 0.061 −0.957 −0.718
γ
(2)
2 [DE-E, SE] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.352 0.062 −0.472 −0.231
γ
(2)
3 [DE-W, USA] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.235 0.049 0.139 0.332
γ
(2)
4 [GB, IE, NO] . . . . . . . . . . . . . −0.903 0.054 −1.009 −0.797
γ
(2)
5 [CH] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.315 0.069 1.179 1.450
γ
(2)
6 [FR, CA] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.542 0.058 0.429 0.655
The fact that all other direct effects are significantly and substantively different from zero
highlights that a multilevel approach to these kind of data is indeed necessary.
A quick look at the covariate estimates and their confidence intervals shows that our
expectations are borne out: Increasing income, being self-employed and supporter of a
more conservative party lowers an individual’s support for social spending. On the other
hand, being unemployed is associated with a clear preference for more social protection.
While unemployment represents a disadvantaged labor market position, skill specificity
indicates the portion of a worker’s skill set that is not portable and hence the degree of
exposure to labor market risks and demand for social protection. Opposite to the effect
of income – and according to Iversen and Soskice’s arguments – skill specificity leads to a
strong preference for social spending.
19
5.4 Ignoring country-item-bias
Finally, I provide a short illustration of the implications of ignoring country-item-bias. As
discussed above, when researchers do not correct for existing country-item-bias, parameter
estimates will be biased. Furthermore, standard errors will be too small if the measurement
and structural model are not jointly estimated (Skrondal and Laake 2001). An impression
of how that may influence our results can be gained from Figure 7, where I compare the
structural estimates from Table 4 with two popular approaches. One employs ordinary
least squares regression with estimated scores from a standard factor analysis as dependent
variable and includes country fixed effects. Standard errors are ‘corrected’ using the well
known Huber-White approach (White 1996; Royall 1986). The other uses a hierarchical
linear model (Steenbergen and Jones 2002) with country random effects and again esti-
mated factor scores as dependent variable. Both approaches assume a state of the world
where only true attitude differences exists (Figure 1, panel A) and they do not correct the
systematic country-item-bias found in Section 5.2. Results from all three models are shown
in Figure 7.
My aim here is not to give definite statements about the general performance of these
different estimation strategies, which could only be achieved by an extensive Monte Carlo
study. Rather, Figure 7 illustrates that including item-bias in one’s model is not a matter
of ‘statistical sophistry’, important only to methodologists, but that it influences one’s
theoretical conclusions. This is most evident for estimates of the role of income and part-
time employment. Both variables provide important information about a respondent’s
economic interests and one would expect them to shape social policy preferences. However,
researchers employing the conventional setups would have to conclude that the effects
of both variables are not statistically different from zero. Contrarily, estimates from the
multilevel mixture IRT model provide results in line with theoretical expectations. Lastly,
note that my model, which corrects for country-item-bias in individuals’ responses to social
spending items, yields even clearer evidence for Iversen and Soskice’s (2001) hypothesized
effect of skill specificity on social policy preferences than the more traditional approaches.
6 Conclusion
Currently, measurement issues do not hold a prominent place in comparative political
research (but see Jackman 2008). They are often rather complex, increase time needed
to estimate the model and have the potential to tell us rather unpleasant things about
the quality of our data. And, one may argue, researchers care more about estimating
relationships between constructs of interest than about latent variable models. However,
the application in this paper shows the clear need to take measurement seriously. Ignoring
it can have serious consequences: Quantities of interest calculated from estimates based
on country-biased items can be grossly misleading. The fact that the key hypothesis about
the role of skill specificity has been strengthened is specific to this application. In a worse
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Figure 7: Point estimates and 95% confidence bounds for effects of covariates [β (2)p ] on
latent spending preferences from from Multilevel mixture ordinal item response model with
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linear model are shown for comparison.
21
case, difference in estimates may lead to a premature rejection of interesting comparative
theories. This also emphasizes the importance of multi-item measurements. If only a single
item is available for analysis, cross-national equivalence cannot be tested but must be
assumed.
In this paper, I presented an item response theory approach that is able to correct for
systematic country biases in measurement, which plague comparative survey research.
It models item responses as result of a cumulative threshold process, which provides a
close link between the theoretical status of the latent variable – a continuous, unobserved
attitude or preference – and the ordinal measurement level of most survey variables. The
hierarchical setup enables a parsimonious model specification for the pooled data, where
only one coefficient per variable of interest has to be estimated – as opposed to one for
each country in a completely unpooled strategy. Unobserved country heterogeneity and
country-item-bias in measurement are captured by a country level latent variable, so that
the resulting structural estimates of our variables of interest are purged from these sources
of bias.
Extending this approach to include binary or even continuous items (as in Quinn 2004)
is straightforward. Furthermore, the model can be extended by country-level variables.
Country factors can be used to explain true attitudinal differences, for example to test
theories about policy feedback. But one can also use country characteristics to learn
more about the nature of item-bias. Researchers can investigate if differences in response
behavior are related to cultural traits (e.g. Hofstede 2001) or to socio-economic conditions
and policies. Furthermore, nothing prevents interested researchers from applying the
general approach outlined here to the subnational level. If a researcher suspects systematic
item-bias between different states of the US, or between different cultural regions of a
country, he or she can use those as level-3 units of the model.
More and more comparative public opinion and behavior scholars test sophisticated
theories using individual-level survey data from different countries. This is a promising
research strategy that puts general theories to test in as many contexts as possible (King
et al. 1994). But, as I have argued in this paper, this enterprise will only yield reliable
results, if we use model specifications that ensure equivalence of our core constructs.
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